

VZCZCXYZ0024  
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1949/01 2491148  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
O 061148Z SEP 06  
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6725  
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001949

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S  
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP  
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC  
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)  
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE  
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PARM PREL CWC

SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR  
WEEK ENDING SEPTEMBER 1

This is CWC-75-06.

-----  
IRAQI ACCESSION TO THE CWC  
-----

¶1. (SBU) Del reps met with senior Technical Secretariat staff on August 31 to discuss the operational requirements that would arise with Iraq's accession to the CWC. The Iraqi Ambassador in The Hague had written to the Director General to inform him that the Iraqi Council of Ministers had approved on August 3 and sent to Parliament the recommendation for Iraqi accession to the CWC. The Iraqi Embassy informed del reps of the note to the DG and also provided an informal view that accession as early as the end of September was possible.

¶2. (SBU) Iraq would need to submit to the OPCW an initial declaration 30 days after deposit of the notification of accession in New York. They would need to submit a final declaration 60 days after accession. Although the original purpose of the August 31 meeting was to energize the TS on planning a follow-up to the workshop held in February in Amman, it quickly evolved into a brainstorming session on the political and legal considerations of an Iraqi declaration, and associated verification responsibilities.

¶3. (SBU) There was general agreement that any follow-up meeting should take place in the Middle East to avoid difficulties the Iraqi delegation might otherwise experience with visas. Head of Verification Horst Reeps anticipates needing at least ten days to complete a draft declaration, with working groups in the areas of industry, chemical weapons, and legislation. He noted, however, that it is difficult to plan the next workshop when the TS has no idea how much work has been done on drafting a declaration since the February meeting. (TS efforts to contact Iraqi counterparts have been unsuccessful, and it seemed clear that the TS expects the U.S. and UK to facilitate future communications.) Reeps also noted that initial efforts were predicated on the assumption that Iraq would accede as a non-possessor; if this is not the case, an initial declaration will be much more complex.

¶4. (SBU) Meeting participants all agreed that Iraq's initial declaration will have significant political implications, and as such will be closely scrutinized by other States Parties, particularly Iran. The difficulties of preparing a declaration when the location and numbers of munitions still in existence in Iraq are unknown were also cited. Chemical Demilitarization Branch head Jerzy Mazur and others questioned the viability of a non-possessor declaration when previous UNSCOM inventories and general public knowledge all point to a sizable number of CW munitions remaining in Iraq. Although no recommendations as to a way forward were made, Legal Advisor Santiago Onate pointed out that while there are legal obligations under the CWC, this is a unique case, and the policy making organs of the OPCW may be able to approve measures justified by exceptional circumstances.

¶5. (SBU) The TS expressed clear concerns about the safety of its inspectors in Iraq, but does not want to be faulted for a failure to uphold their requirements under the Convention. The TS staff pointed out that even without inspections of CW storage facilities or former production facilities, Iraq's Article VI declaration would need to be verified. The TS participants noted that the DG would have the authority to state that the conduct of inspections in Iraq could be suspended due to a dangerous security situation. They also referred to the provision in the CWC for "bilateral verification agreements." The TS is also concerned about the public image of the organization, citing their concern that unrealistically high expectations may arise of the OPCW being able to successfully handle its obligations under exceptionally difficult circumstances.

-----  
TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT INSPECTION  
-----

¶6. (U) In response to the DG note inviting States Parties to familiarize themselves with new equipment of the OPCW, a team from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency conducted a technical equipment inspection (TEI) at the OPCW Equipment Store from August 28-31. The team reported that, overall, they had no concerns regarding equipment on the original list. The OPCW did, however, add several items for certification after the team arrived. Most items could still be evaluated; however, in anticipation of inspecting only the original list, the team did not include an analytical expert, and was unable to complete inspection of this particular piece of equipment.

¶7. (U) Del rep attended one morning of equipment testing, during which Senior Technical Support Officer Kangi Makiyama and acting Head of Laboratory Miedczyslaw Sokolowski offered a brief tour of the lab. The tour was informative, and offered an opportunity for an exchange with TS staff on concerns of particular relevance for the lab and analytical capabilities of the OPCW. Sokolowski noted several times that the GCMS currently used by the lab are not "top of the line," but also pointed out that the OPCW does adhere to high analytical standards. In fact, until recently the organization had been using a separate purchasing company who would purchase and test equipment to a higher standard than typically found on the market. This company, however, has recently decided for financial reasons to discontinue its services.

¶8. (U) Sokolowski also voiced his (fairly standard) concern regarding effects of the tenure policy. He pointed out that this policy could be particularly detrimental to the lab, where a highly specialized technical staff is critical. He further noted that the lab must draw from a very limited pool of qualified experts, and that it is unrealistic to expect geographic distribution of employees when certain regions are usually unable to field qualified candidates.

¶9. (U) Javits sends.  
ARNALL